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FEDERAL TAXES AND THE RADIATING POTENCIES
OF STATE COURT DECISIONS
MICHAEL H. CARDOZO, IV.t
THE process of decision in the federal courts has enabled a number
of taxpayers to reduce their taxes by preventing the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue from arguing in court what may be the vital issue
of a case. They have accomplished this by obtaining a decision of a
state court on issues of local law involved in a federal tax proceeding.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that a local rule of law
is what any state court has most recently said it is, although such court
may be far from the top of the local judicial hierarchy.' Federal judges
now apparently have no power to look into the sources of local law, once
the local court has spoken. They must accept the latter's view unless
some undefined "convincing evidence" shows it to be wrong.
Professor Corbin, in a trenchant article, has analyzed a few of the
ramifications of these decisions.2  He dwelt principally on the plight
of the litigant unwillingly brought into the federal court, possibly on
diversity of citizenship, and confronted with an adverse decision of a
local lower court, rendered in a prior case, on the issue involved in his
proceeding. The later litigant may have more at stake and may be able
to retain more learned and diligent counsel than the I sing party in the
earlier case who failed to appeal.3 Nevertheless, le has no chance to
present his argument on the local law.
t Member of the New York Bar; formerly with the Securities and Exchange C0ni-
mission; now attorney in Tax Division of Department of justice. The opinions e.-
pressed in this article do not express the views of the Department of justice or of the
Treasury Department, but only those of the author.
1. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 19 (141-0); Six Companies v. Highvay
Dist., 311 U. S. 180 (1940); West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 2J l40). Althi,,ugh
the decisions relied upon in the Field case came from courts of original jurisdiction, the
Court may have intended to hold that only decisions of intermediate appellate and high-
er courts would be binding. Compare Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U. S. 534,
543, n. 21 (1941).
2. Corbin, The Laws of the Several Stales (1941) 50 YAL; L. J. 762. The tax
aspects of the question are discussed briefly and the relevant Labes cited in PAUL, IFU.o1:,L
ESTATE AND Gir TAxATIoN (1942) § 1.11.
3. The litigants in two of the three cases cited supra nte 1 did have oinsider-
ably more at stake than those in the state court proceedings on which the decisions
depended. In the Field case $4,230.36 was in issue. Record on Appeal, It. 18. In the
two cases cited as binding authority there were $502.05 [Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co.,
119 N. J. Eq. 408, 182 AtI. 912 (1936)] and $496.51 [Travers v. Reid, 119 N. J. Eq. 416,
182 AtL 908 (1936)] at stake. In the Six Companies case, over $140,l0GU w.as at stake,
while in the case cited as binding authority there was under $23,00 involved. Sinnvit
v. Schumacher, 45 Cal. App. 46, 187 Pac. 105 (1919).
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This situation enables certain taxpayers to profit in dealing with the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, notwithstanding the latter's access
to advice on the law of each case from a battery of attorneys, ready
to present scholarly briefs and arguments.4 The taxpayers' advantage
is founded on the facts that substantially all federal tax cases arise in
federal courts and that the results often turn on issues of local law.
The cornerstone of the practice is obtaining the decision from a local
court, which is then submitted to the .presiding official in the federal
court with the confident assurance that his honor need look no further
for the local rule of law. Although the policy of the federal courts to
follow state decisions in this field allowed the perfection of the technique
before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,5 that celebrated overruling has probably made the application
of the technique more easily successful.
Take, as a pre-Tompkins case example, the case of Mr. Edward T.
Blair, beneficiary of a testamentary trust created under the will of his
father. In 1923 he executed instruments of assignment of parts of the
income from the trust in favor of his children. The Commissioner, in
connection with 1923 taxes, ruled that the trust was spendthrift in nature,
and that the assignments were invalid. Consequently the entire income
was held taxable to Mr. Blair. As is usual in such cases, allocation of all
the income to one person rather than its dispersal among several resulted
in higher aggregate taxes. Mr. Blair sought relief from this ruling by
appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals, and won a temporary victory.' The
Board's decision, however, was soon reversed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which found that under the law of
Illinois the assignments were invalid and that the income was taxable
to Mr. Blair.7 Certiorari was denied.8
In the month following the denial of certiorari, the trustees, express-
ing fear that they might be surcharged if they continued to pay the
trust income under the assignments, requested the Superior Court of
Cook County, which had jurisdiction of the estate, to enter a decree
construing the trust instrument and instructing them as to their power
to distribute income to the children. In the petition the trustees called
4. Not only are all the attorneys in the Bureau of Internal Revenue available, but
also those in the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, and several more in the
office of the Solicitor General.
5. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). It has been suggested that the Tompkins case should be
applied only in cases arising in Federal Courts on diversity of citizenship and not in
cases involving original jurisdiction, such as bankruptcy and the like. See D'Oench,
Duhme & Co., Inc., v. F.D.I.C., 10 U. S. L. WEEK 4223 (U. S. 1942), and especially
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, id. at 4226; see also (1938) 13 ST. JoHN's
L. Ray. 71, 80.
6. Edward T. Blair, 18 B. T. A. 69 (1929).
7. Commissioner v. Blair, 60 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
8. Blair v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 602 (1933).
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attention to the decisions of the Board and of the Circuit Court.' All
the beneficiaries of the trust were summoned before the court, but there
is no evidence that notice of the proceedings was given to the Com-
missioner. The judge of the Superior Court agreed with the Circuit
Court of Appeals and held that the assignments were invalid, although
he also stated obiter that the trustees, not having been parties to the
actions in the federal courts, were not bound by the decisions therein.1"
The assignees, in danger of losing the portions of the income that their
father wanted to give them, appealed the decision to the Appellate Court
of Illinois, and obtained a reversal." The assignments were there held
valid, one of the three judges dissenting. Clearly the split in the Illinois
courts showed that the applicable rule of law was not obvious. A party
truly interested in having the assignments invalidated might have tried
to appeal the case. However, it would have been surprising if the mem-
bers of the taxpayer's family should have really wanted to upset the
settlement that he had made. They would naturally be willing to abide
by a decision confirming it, and it is not surprising that apparently no
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was sought. Nor is it unlikely that
the family foresaw a tax saving as a result of the decision. As already
noted, the Commissioner was not in court to take a stand adverse to
the family, or to protect his own interests by asking for review.
About three weeks after the entry of the decree pursuant to the Illinois
Appellate Court's decision, a motion was made requesting a final hearing
on the taxpayer's appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals in connection
with income taxes for 1924, 1925 and 1926.-12 At this hearing, the state
court proceedings were duly admitted in evidence, and the Board held
itself bound to accept the verdict that the assignments were valid."a The
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the state court's opinion as to
Illinois law, although "not unlike a consent decree," was binding. Never-
theless, it reversed the Board on the ground that the assignments did
not mean that the income was no longer that of the taxpayer, but merely
that he had instructed the trustees to deliver it to the assignees after
he had constructively received it when due."4 The Supreme Court deemed
the latter view a strained 6onstruction and reversed, holding that none
of the assigned income was taxable to the assignor, Mr. Blair, because
the state court had ruled that it was not his." The Court pointed out
9. Record on Appeal, pp. 58-59, Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
10. Id. at 77-78.
11. Blair v. Linn, 274 IIl. App. 23 (1934).
12. Record on Appeal, supra note 9, at 2, 13.
13. Edward T. Blair, 31 B. T. A. 1192 (1935).
14. Commissiojier v. Blair, 83 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
15. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937). The Court rejected the res judi-
cata argument by citing the intervening decision of the state court as creating a new
situation and warranting a new decision.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that there was no "basis for the charge that the [state court] suit was
collusive and the decree inoperative."
No quarrel can be had with the general rule that the judgments of
state courts on local law must govern such questions when they arise
in the federal courts. Nor is there objection herein to the principle that
the local decisions are law even though rendered by lower or intermediate
appellate courts. Nevertheless, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in rendering its first decision in the Blair case, was not
violating the rule later established in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins when
it held, in accordance with the Commissioner's determination, that the
assignments by Mr. Blair were invalid. Its reading of the Illinois law,
admittedly controlling,'" was the basis of its decision. Of course, it did
not then have the benefit of a "datum" by a state court on the precise
question before it, namely, whether the particular trust was spendthrift
or not. It did have the benefit of research and argument by Government
counsel, however, which were not available to the Appellate Court of
Illinois, although the latter had before it the reasoning of the federal
circuit court.
As pointed out by Professor Corbin," the important feature of the
rule of the cases under discussion is that the principle adopted by the
Supreme Court seems to prevent one of the parties from arguing its view
of the law. By use of the local forum, the parties interested in the
Blair trust effectively prevented the Government from arguing that the
trust was spendthrift. It was "not open to the Government" to argue
that question, the Supreme Court stated. From a purely legal point
of view, the surface regularity of the state court proceedings stands in
the way of a charge of fraud or collusion, but it is highly significant
that the two trustees who brought the state court proceedings were Mr.
Blair, the taxpayer, and one of his sons, an assignee of the income.18
Clearly no one who appeared in that suit had any palpable interest in
invalidating the assignments. The right to receive the income might
have been restored to the taxpayer, but he himself originally procured
the assignments. The Government was the only party in fact adversely
affected by the outcome of the proceedings, but it never had a day in
court to argue the rule of law before the judges who finally decided
issues which governed its right to the taxes claimed.
16. But cf. note 5 supra.
17. See Corbin, supra note 2, at 768, 775.
18. Record on Appeal,' supra note 9, at 53-54. Compare Otto C. Botz, 45 B. T. A.
No. 151 (1941), where the Board held that the state court proceedings were collusive and
could be disregarded because there was no adverse interest represented. Occasionally a
local court's action might be attacked for another reason. For example. in Tooley v, Com-
missioner, 121 F. (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941), the court held that the probate court
had acted without jurisdiction and that its decision was not binding.
[Vol. 51 : 783
1942] FEDERAL TAXES AND STATE DECISIONS
The pattern of the Blair litigation may be found in a number of other
federal tax cases. A leading example is Freider v. Helvering,0 which
concerned income from a trust created by the will of A. C. Whitcomb.
The trustees for a number of years had distributed the income to the
beneficiaries without withholding sums for depreciation reserves. How-
ever, deductions for the proper amounts of each year's wear and tear on
the assets were taken by the beneficiaries in computing federal taxes on
the trust income. Liability for higher taxes claimed by the Commis-
sioner depended on whether or not these sums were "distributable"
under the instrument, in accordance with the statutory terms. ° The
Board of Tax Appeals twice held that they were distributable and tax-
able to the beneficiaries to whom they were actually distributed.2 ' The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed one of the Board
cases.22 A few months thereafter the trustees started accounting pro-
ceedings in the California court having administrative jurisdiction over
the trust. A ruling was obtained to the effect that the sums were not
distributable, and should be repaid.23 No one appealed. The beneficiaries,
armed with this decision, promptly returned to the federal courts and
pointed out the error of the previous holdings. The United States
Supreme Court ultimately said that the taxpayers were right, that the
sums representing depreciation were not distributable, because the state
judge had said so in a proceeding which could not be deemed collusive
or based on consent of all the parties. 4 However, the only party whose
interests were in truth at stake was the unrepresented Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. The beneficiaries, including the taxpayers involved,
devised a method of repayment approved by the California court which
the three dissenting justices in the United States Supreme Court thought
specious as a means of reducing the amount of taxable income.'
The result in the Freuler case is paralleled by the decisions of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the litigation over
the tax liability of the beneficiaries of the Hubbell trust. That court
reversed itself on the question of the distributability of certain income
19. 291 U. S. 35 (1934).
20. Revenue Act of 1921, §219(d).
21. Louise P. V. Whitcomb, 4 B. T. A. 80 (1926); 'Marguerite T. Whitcomb, 5
B. T. A. 191 (1926).
22. Whitcomb v. Blair, 25 F. (2d) 528 (App. D. C. 1923).
23. Record on Appeal, pp. 140-44, Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934).
24. The purpose in the minds of the persons who instituted the state court action is
at least equivocal. In Commonwealth v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 171 Ky. 519,
183 S. W. 658 (1916), appears the pertinent statement that a decision in a prior action
would be binding in a tax proceeding unless "rendered with the purpose of defeating
the commonwealth in the collection of its taxes."
25. 291 U. S. 35, 51-52.
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from the trust after a judge of the Polk County, Iowa, District Court
had said that its interpretation of the trust was wrong.20
It is noteworthy that these taxpayers, like the parties involved in the
Blair case, did not appeal to the higher courts of the state after obtain-
ing decisions in the lower courts which would effectively prevent the
collection of the taxes the Commissioner was claiming. This is not
surprising However, in occasional cases appeals have been taken to the
highest state courts for interpretations of local law to be used later in
federal courts. For example, in the litigation over who should pay the
taxes on the income from certain trusts established by Mr. F. W. Fitch,
it became necessary to determine the Iowa law on the finality of divorce
settlements in that state. The United States Supreme Court had admitted
its inability to do more than speculate as to the power of the Iowa courts
to modify an alimony award.17 Consequently, Mr. Fitch, who had been
burdened with unexpected taxes as a result of his inability to dispel the
Court's doubt, took the obvious course. He commenced proceedings to
"test out the Iowa law ' 28 and eliminate doubt thereafter. The form of
the Iowa action, of course, had to appear regular and could not be merely
a proceeding to determine tax liability. So he sued to have the alimony
award modified, naming his former wife as defendant. The lower Iowa
court held that he had no right to the relief requested. Then, although
the decision was in accord with the position he had taken previously in
the Supreme Court, and had believed to be correct, he appealed to the
Supreme Court of Iowa, which duly affirmed the lower court with the
comment that it had thought the law to have been "fairly well settled. '" t
When the Commissioner once more had a chance to argue to the con-
trary, he was still in a federal court, the Board of Tax Appeals, and
it was too late for him to express his view of the Iowa law. A state
judge had spoken. Thenceforth Mr. Fitch's income taxes would be just
what he had intended them to be when he created the alimony trust.80
26. Hubbell v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S.
840 (1931) ; Hubbell v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). See also Boat
v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 19 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
27. Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149 (1940). In certain cases the federal court,
may not decide doubtful questions depending on state law until a state court has spoken.
Thompson v. Magnolia Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940); Railroad Comm. v. Pullman Co.,
312 U. S. 496 (1941). Could this rule be applied to tax cases such as Helvering v.
Fitch, supra and Pearce v. Commissioner. 120 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), aff'd,
10 U. S. L. WEEK 4260 (U. S. 1942)?
28. Transcript of Record, p. 6, quoting from the oral argument of counsel for Fitch
before the Board of Tax Appeals in Numbers 93340 and 98131.
29. Fitch v. Fitch, 229 Iowa 349, 294 N. W. 577 (1940). If Mrs. Fitch had been
eager and well advised, she could have argued that the question of power to revise was
moot because Mr. Fitch had not shown any valid ground for obtaining a reduction of
his payments.
30. F. W. Fitch, 43 B. T. A. 773 (1941).
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The mists of the Supreme Court's uncertainty, now pierced by authentic
evidence of the law of the locality, had been scattered."
The litigation involving the Lowe estate is one of the most interesting
examples of the use of state courts for the solution of federal tax prob-
lems. The executors of the estate of Albert Lowe, in conjunction with
his children, obtained from a county circuit court in Florida an inter-
pretation of the decedent's will. The court ruled in accordance with the
construction requested by all persons appearing in the case, so that there
was no losing party. This decision was appealed to the Florida Supreme
Court and affirmed. 2 The opinion indicates that the action had been
brought to settle a controversy arising out of the claim for taxes asserted
by the Commissioner. The interpretation of the will which was adopted
by the court seems to conflict with a number of its previous decisions,
which were apparently not being overruled.33 However, it did effectively
put a stumbling-block in front of the collection of the estate taxes claimed
by the Commissioner, who, of course, was not represented before the
court. Although the liability of the Lowe estate for taxes has not as
yet been fixed, the decision has already been cited by other litigants
to defeat a tax claim arising out of similar circumstances. 4
Local law does not control in every case involving interpretations of
words or acts. Local rules of property do not, for example, govern cases
in which the issue is the applicability of the words of the revenue act
to the particular facts, rather than the determination of the taxpayer's
legal interest." Thus, in United States -. Pelcr30 the Court held that
the tax-payer had made a gift of "future interests in property." How-
ever, it was emphasized that the words "future interests in property"
in the gift tax act are not necessarily the same as "future interests"
under the common law of the state from which the case arose. The
taxpayer in that case had good reason to believe that the local courts
would hold that the donees had received present vested interests under
31. Compare Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52. 57 (1033). Also in that case the
following appears at p. 58: "Indeed the radiating p,.,tencies of a decision may goi beyond
the actual holding."
32. Lowe v. Lowe, 142 Fla. 266, 194 So. 015 (1941).
33. See Sloan v. Sloan, 73 Fla. 345, 74 So. 407 (1917) ; Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Roberts, 120 Fla. 392, 162 So. 881 (1935).
34. See Webster v. Commissioner, 120 F. (2d) 514, 515 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
35. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399 (1941); Morgan v. Cmnissioner, 36's
U. S. 78 (1940) ; Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S. 188 (1938) ; Burnet v. Harmel, 27 U. S.
103 (1932). See Comment, State Law and Uniformity in Federal Taxation (1941) 55
Hf.fm L. REv. 255; PAUL, SELECrED STUDIES IN FEDEPn.u TAXACioi, SEco:an SEMZS
(1938) 1-52.
36. 312 U. S. 399 (1941). The tax statute concerned was the gift tax acL Revenue
Act of 1932, § 504(b).
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Alabama law,3" but it would not have aided him to get the local courts
to say so.
One taxpayer actually went to the trouble of obtaining a state court
decree which ultimately proved futile. In that case the state court action
was started about two weeks after the argument in the Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the local judge's decision, which was rendered on the
day after the hearing, was introduced in the latter court by motion.80
The motion was to reverse and remand to the Board for consideration
of the effect of the state court decision. Service of the motion papers
constituted the Commissioner's first notice of the proceeding in the local
court. However, the Circuit Court refused to consider the decree bind-
ing on the Government, "which was not a party, and which of course
has no right of appeal."' 30 Possibly the Supreme Court, following the
Blair decision, would have disagreed with the Circuit Court's view of
its duty with respect to state court decisions, but the appeal was dis-
missed by stipulation at the threshold of argument.
Another class of cases in which local decisions may be irrelevant are
those where the parties are in disagreement over the facts and not the
law. The Supreme Court has never held that the Commissioner must
follow a decision of a state court in a case where the only issues before
the local court were pure questions of fact. Most issues do not fall
clearly into one or the other category of questions of law and fact, but
there are a few available examples of issues of fact untarnished by a
dispute over the legal conclusions. For example, whether a written docu-
ment is a forgery and whether it was signed on a given day would
clearly be questions of fact. Similarly, the intention of the parties as
expressed in the document would be a matter for the trier of facts to
determine.40 If a probate court decides that a decedent owned certain
property, it is reaching a legal conclusion on the question of who is
the owner. However, the parties may be in agreement as to what the
consequences of the facts will be: that if A handed a document to B
on Christmas day, B owned the property involved, and vice versa. The
whole case may turn on whether the trier of facts believes A or B.
Therefore, the final judgment that A actually is the owner, although a
conclusion of law, is merely a resolution of a controversy over the factual
issues. If a distinction is to be made between the binding effect of
state decisions on questions of law and of fact, then the Commissioner
37. See, e.g., Watters v. First Nat. Bank, 233 Ala. 227, 171 So. 280 (1936); Har-
rison v. Harrison, 213 Ala. 418, 105 So. 179 (1925).
38. The record of proceedings in the Circuit Court of Appeals shows the manner
in which the state court decree was introduced.
39. Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. denied,
303 U. S. 665 (1938). Even if the state court decree had been deemed binding, tile
Government might have prevailed on the strength of other issues in the case.
40. Colorado Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23 (1938).
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must go beyond the decision and determine whether or not the parties
were in disagreement on the facts alone or on the law. If the only
controversy was over the facts, perhaps he could ignore the ruling of
the state court.41 The Blair and Frculcr cases would not be strictly in
point, since in those cases the facts were stipulated and the courts had
only questions of law to decide.
In one decided case' the difference between factual and legal issues
was urged upon a Circuit Court of Appeals as a reason for instructing
the Board of Tax Appeals to make findings of fact independently of
certain state court decrees. In that case, four children had executed an
instrument which was clearly worded as an absolute assignment to their
mother of all their interests in their father's estate. After their mother's
death about ten years later, they alleged that they had misunderstood
the purport of the instrument, and had intended only to give their
mother a life interest. They sought and obtained, without notice to the
Commissioner, an order from a county circuit court in Missouri, reform-
ing the instrument to read that only a life interest was given to the
mother.. As a result, at her death she was deemed to have owned one-
fifth of her husband's estate rather than all of it. The effect on the
federal estate tax liability was a reduction from $13,000 to zero. The
Board of Tax Appeals held that the Commissioner had to accept the
state court's conclusion as the intention of the children,-" and this was
approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The only issue decided by the lower state court was that the clfldren
had intended to give their mother a life estate rather than a fee interest.
This involved a decision on a question of fact only."' All the witnesses
before that court were called by the proponents of the reformation, and
there was no opposition to the granting of it. " An administrator ad
litem appeared for the estate, but obviously his interest was not adverse
to the petition because the ultimate effect was to reduce the taxes against
the estate by a substantial sum. All the heirs and legatees of the dece-
dent were in favor of the change, and it is clear that their ultimate
financial interests were benefited by it." There is, of course, no evi-
41. Compare Burton v. Burke, C. C. H. 1941 Fed. Inherit. & Gift Tax Serv. 11091
(D. Kan. 1941).
42. Helvering v. Rhodes' Estate, 117 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A. Sth, 1941).
43. Hugh D. Rhodes et al., 41 B. T. A. 62 (1940).
44. The intention of a party is a question of fact. Colorado Bank v. Commissioner,
305 U. S. 23 (1938).
45. This is demonstrated by the record of proceedings before the local court.
46. The four children were the sole legatees of the residuary estate of their mother.
The result of the case was to give them the same property without administration as
part of their mother's estate. Although the three sons did lose a contingent right t,
receive the sister's share in case of her death within eight years, it is clear that the
additional sums received as a result of the tax saving were greater than the value of
these remote contingent interests.
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dence that they were not entirely truthful in their allegation that the
original intention was to give only a life estate, but sometimes cross-
examination by an adverse party can turn tip discrepancies in testimony
not otherwise evident. If the reformation had not been binding on the
Commissioner, the intention of the children and the question of the
ownership of four-fifths of the property would have been in issue before
the Board of Tax Appeals, not treated as though res judicatac. The
Board would have perceived a reason to question the testimony of the
interested parties and their witnesses which was not at all evident to
the local judge, who was not apprised of the tax consequences involved.
Although the judge might be expected to ,scrutinize the proceedings for
ulterior motives, why should he not accept the word of every party in
apparent interest as to the facts of a case? Are not issues frequently
presented on agreed statements of facts?
Indeed, the Commissioner has frequently been confronted with the
problem of dealing with clear cases of agreed alterations of the facts
of cases. These arise most often in estate tax matters, where the per-
sons interested in the estate have composed their differences by making
a settlement acceptable to all. The state probate court then enters a
decree settling the accounts of the executors or administrators in ac-
cordance with the agreement of the heirs and distributees. Thereafter,
the Commissioner is asked to accept such decree as determinative of
the size of the estate, the amount left to charity and so forth. The
compromise in the probate court may have been made with no thought
of tax consequences, and surely the law favors such conclusions of liti-
gation. But why should the Commissioner be forced to accept lower
taxes as a result of the consent decree? As a matter of fact, in one
case the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit refused to allow
a deduction from an estate although the probate court had decided that
the claim was valid in an uncontested accounting. In a number of other
decisions the Commissioner has been permitted to show the true facts
as they existed when the death occurred, and the taxes have been col-
lected without consideration of the compromise arrangement. 4
Therecis no ground in logic for requiring the Commissioner to abide
by the finding of a state court on a question of fact.48 The principle
47. First Mechanics Nat. Batik v. Commissioner, 117 F. (2d) 127 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940). See also Robbins v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ; United
States v. Mitchell, 74 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Mississippi Valley Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 72 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 604
(1934); Theodore C. Jackson et al., 32 B. T. A. 470 (1935); Estate of J. Sage v.
Commissioner, 122 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Edgar M. Carnrick, 21 B. T. A.
12 (1930).
48. In Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1349-
50, it is suggested that the Tompkins rule does not apply where only facts were in issue
in the state court.
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of comity, the desirability of uniformity in legal rules, and the theory
that local judges have a special competence to understand local usages,
customs and the common law are the reasons for requiring adherence
to decisions of local courts. But they do not demand acceptance by
federal judges of findings on factual issues made in cases arising in
state courts between parties not litigating again and not in privity Ith
the litigants before the federal court."' Identical issues of fact must
frequently be tried over, for the rule of res judicata applies only when
the parties are identical or in privity."0 Each party is entitled to have
his day in court and his argument of the facts heard once, even though
the same issues may have been determined in a prior case involving
someone else.
The denouncers of Swift -,. Tyson,a who hailed the decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, were more concerned with the danger of diverse
rules of law within the borders of one state than with the possibility
that a litigant might be forced to argue one issue twice. Indeed, Mr.
justice Brandeis, who wrote the prevailing opinion in the Tompkhis
case, has said that "unless duly summoned in a legal proceeding, a person
not.a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not
affect his legal rights. '112 In the same place it was stated that the law
does not expect a person to intervene voluntarily in a suit to which he
is a stranger in order to obtain a hearing. Furthermore, as pointed out
by Professor Corbin, there are indications in recent Supreme Court
decisions that a litigant may argue that the most recent decision of a
state court is not in line with the law of that state as declared in other
sources." The essence of the rule of the Tompkins case seems to be
that the federal courts must avoid any suggestion that they are not fol-
lowing state law, where it is applicable, as declared by the state courts.
There must be one uniform rule within each state, and this rule is what
the local judges say it is. However, there is no evidence that the Supreme
Court meant that the latest statement of any local judge shall determine
what the local law is. In fact, the court admitted that it might be possible
49. Compare Mutual Life Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934). Even federal
judges are deemed learned in the law of the jurisdictiois in which they bit. Mac~regor's
Estate v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 10 U. S. L. WEK 4214 (U. S. 1942).
50. "The foundation of the doctrine of res judicata is that there has been a judicial
inquiry into the subject matter, in which the person to be affected by the judgment has
had an opportunity by representative to be heard fully." Rugg, J., in Old Dominion
Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193 (1909), aff'd, 225 U. S. Ill (1912).
51. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
52. Chase Nat. Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U. S. 431, 441 (1934). See also the con-
curring opinion of Chief justice Stone in Hungerfvrd's Estate V. New York Trust Co.,
10 U. S. L. WEK 4197, 4199 (U. S. 1942).
53. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 180; Six Companies v. Highway
Dist., 311 U. S. 180, 188 (1940).
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to discover more convincing evidence of the state law than the latest
opinion of a lower court judge. In one case the Court intimated that
it would be willing to consider a reason, if advanced, for supposing that
the ruling of the state court on the very facts before it would not again
be followed."' Consequently it seems apparent that the Court would
permit the Commissioner's representatives to argue their view of the law
as long as they stuck to an exegesis of the local law, based on statutes,
decisions and other authorities emanating from the state only, possibly
embellished with references to changing mores and analogies with rules
in other states.55 Such an argument would be no less persuasive where
the latest local decision was rendered in connection with the facts of the
very case pending before the federal court. The local law is still to be
found by studying precedents, as in any case in a state court. 0 Since
res judicata is not involved,"7 the local court's opinion on the identical
facts is entitled to no more weight than any precedent that would be
cited for purposes of stare decisis.
Certain more complicated procedures could be devised for protecting
the revenue from the particular evil discussed herein. If the taxpayer
who seeks a state court adjudication on an issue of law that will be
involved in a subsequent tax proceeding gives the Commissioner notice
of the pending action and the latter is allowed by the court to file a
brief and appear in oral argument, then there can be no objection to
his being bound by the decision reached on legal issues. ie has had
his day in court. It is clear, however, that if the issue is on the facts,
it would be difficult to arrange to give him an opportunity to present
all the evidence that he deems necessary and to allow cross-examination.
Furthermore, it would be complicated to present all the evidence needed
for a tax case during a trial in which the ultimate issues were between
private litigants.
Consequently the Commissioner can have his day in court where the
facts are disputed only if he is allowed to litigate them from the begin-
ning in the actual tax proceeding before a federal court. The courts may
eventually hold that the Commissioner is not bound by the state court
findings of fact. Congress might hasten such a result by enacting a
54. West v. A.T.&T., 311 U. S. 223, 238 (1940). Perhaps a sufficient reason
would be found if there were conflicting state court decisions. Compare Graham v.
White-Phillips Co., 296 U. S. 27 (1935).
55. In Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (U. S. 1827), the Supreme Court, while
acknowledging that the law of New York governed the issues, did not blindly accept a
decision of a New York court rendered in a prior case involving the same will and facts.
The Court first studied other sources of New York law to ascertain whether the New
York court had been right.
56. Compare Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202, 209 (1938).
57. However, in the Blair case the Court used language equally appropriate to a
discussion of res judicata. See 300 U. S. 5, 10 (1937).
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provision in the tax law giving the Comnissioner's determination of
fact a presumption of correctnesss until evidence of the facts them-
selves, and not of another court's findings of fact, has been presented
to the federal court trying the tax case. This is a reasonable require-
ment which would permit the Commissioner to have his just day in
court. No undue burden is placed on taxpayers, who generally must
present evidence in court in order to contest a tax claim.
When a taxpayer, without opposition by a determined opponent, has
obtained a judgment of a state court on a question of law and the
Commissioner has not been heard in defense of his view of the lucal
rule, the latter should be given an opportunity to show that the state
judge erred. Courts have frequently stated that a decision should only
bind those who had an opportunity to appeal from it." Possibly an
appeal to the highest court of the state would have resulted in a different
decision in the Blair case, for example.c" Of course, if the decision of
the state court appears clearly correct, so that further argument, even
by another party with a strong adverse interest, would not change the
result, then no harm is suffered from requiring the Commissioner to
follow the decision despite the denial of an opportunity to presefit his
case. However, the best test of the correctness of a decision is its ability
to withstand attack by those adversely affected by it. Judges have been
known to admit that their previous views were in error,"' and courts
have frequently reversed themselves. 12 The fact that a decision even
of the state's highest court has been obtained need not always be deemed
conclusive evidence of the law of that state. In the Fitch case, for
example, the local decisions whid caused the United States Supreme
Court to think the law of Iowa was in confusion were considered clear
by the Supreme Court of Iowa. The opinion of the latter court, how-
ever, was rendered in a case in which the plans of both parties, carefully
considered prior to the divorce, would have been upset if a different
decision had been reached. Is it not possible that the eloquence of
Government counsel could have convinced the state court that the power
to alter did exist? They appeared before the United States Supreme
Court, which concluded that the Iowa law was in doubt. The Iowa
Supreme Court, without hearing Government counsel, decided that its
58. See WVelch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111 (1933).
59. See, c.g., Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) S0 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
60. In this connection it is noteworthy that three state court judges thought the
trusts were not spendthrift in nature, but two others, the lower court judge and the
dissenting Appellate Court judge, thought otherwise, as had the three judges of the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.
61. Compare 'McBrier v. Commissioner, 103 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), and
NLRB v. Newark Morning L. Co., 120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
62. Reversals of prior holdings by the same court are nut uncoxnmn. See Bur-
net v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406-10 (1932).
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prior decisions had left no room for dispute that the decree was un-
alterable.
It was long believed that the founding fathers provided for federal
jurisdiction in cases of diversity of citizenship because they feared the
prejudices of local judges in favor of their own people." Perhaps the
fear was groundless,64 but today in tax cases the Commissioner may
well fear harm from the decisions of individual state judges, although
more because of the taxpayers' guile than judicial prejudice. The col-
lection of revenue should be protected from obstruction by state court
judgments procured in cases involving spurious or trumped-up issues
between parties who have no fundamental difference of opinion. Proper
administration of the tax structure requires that no taxpayer be allowed
an advantage not available to others similarly situated, although amounts
involved in particular cases may be small.
In recognition of the need for greater protection of the interests of
.the Government in cases where the constitutionality of federal laws is
questioned, Congress has provided that all federal courts must notify the
Attorney General and permit him to intervene as a party whenever such
an issue arises before them." A desire for assurance that the Govern-
ment's position will be presented by competent and zealous counsel en-
gendered this bill," since the parties on both sides of sonic constitutional
cases have been found equally hopeful that the act would be held in-
valid. Without a real party in interest represented, the arguments for
constitutionality were unlikely to be urged sincerely."'
The Commissioner could not be notified of every case involving issues
that might eventually arise in a federal tax matter, and the nature of
the Government's interest might be obscure before the tax proceedings
had been started. The tax aspects of the questions might not even appear
for many years after the decision, although only in those cases brought
in the best of faith would this occur. State court decisions in which
the ultimate effect on tax liability was not in the mind of the moving
63. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 87 (U. S. 1809).
64. See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction (1928) 41 HAitV.
L. REv. 483.
65. See 50 STAr. 751 (1937), 28 U. S. C. §401 (1940). In this connection it is
noteworthy that the Government had intervened in the obviously important cases of
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238
•(1936), both of which had started as suits between private litigants. See also David
Al. Heyman, 44 B, T. A. 1009 (1941), pending on appeal before the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where the taxpayer sought a state court adjudica-
tion of his rights under a trust indenture and the Commissioner filed an affidavit point-
ing out the tax aspects of the proceedings. Heyman v. Heyman, N. Y. L. J., January 31,
1942, p. 478, col. 5.
66. See 81 CONG. REc. 3254, 3258 (1937).
67. See id. at 3272.
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party may even redound to the Commissioner's ultimate benefit, as well
as to the tax-payers'. 6  The unfortunate results of other cases might
be avoided by requiring a taxpayer to litigate anew every issue of law
and fact in his controversy with the Commissioner, unless he gave ade-
quate notice to the latter when the earlier proceeding was instituted. The
Commissioner might then intervene to present the Government's views."
However, this might well prove to be but slight protection, since the
position of the Government is not static, and must perforce conform
to new statutes and court decisions. Furthermore, the Government's
prime interest is not in arguing for one or another particular rule of
state law, but in the assurance the decision shall be reached after full
deliberation rather than casual presentation by the advocates of only
one side. The better solution to the problem would be to give all state
court decisions only their proper weight. Whether or not notice were
given to the Commissioner before presentation of the question in the
federal court, the earlier decision should be treated only as a precedent,
not given effect equivalent to res judicata. If the prior litigation had
involved only issues of fact, then the facts should be tried over again,
upon the same or new evidence, as is always the situation when new
parties oppose each other. If legal issues were presented, the federal
judge should be as free as a state judge to decide what the law is. Thus
the Commissioner could always have his say. Moreover, the federal
revenue would be protected against the perfunctory actions of local
courts, induced, frequently surreptitiously, by taxpayers who perceive
that a judge is more likely to decide his way if no one on the other side
has a true interest in a different result.
68. See Plunkett v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. Ist, 1941); Commis-
sioner v. Greene, 119 F. (2d) 383 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); Dysart v. Commissioner, 95
F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cort. denied. 305 U. S. 698 (193R); Cassius E. Wake-
field, 44 B. T. A. 677 (1941).
69. See Berger, Intervention by Public Aqencies in Prikale Litilii in the Fc-
eral Courts (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 65.
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